CAN THEISTS AVOID
EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO MORAL
(AND NORMATIVE) REALISM?
Justin Morton

Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists
can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so
easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to
epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may
not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting
this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to
the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral
claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological objections to moral (and, in fact, normative) realism.

Introduction
Many epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. While it’s unclear whether such objections work
against non-theistic moral realists, many philosophers seem to think that
theistic realists have an obvious escape route: if God exists, there is clearly
no epistemological obstacle to moral realism. Yet because this is taken as
so obvious, such suggestions are crucially underdeveloped. In this paper, I
have two main purposes. First, I want to show that things are not so simple.
There is a good case to be made that any plausible theistic reply to these
objections begs the question by relying on a substantive moral claim when
our knowledge of such is precisely what is in question. My second purpose is to show how the theist can plausibly answer this challenge: she can
argue, without relying on any substantive moral claims of the kind targeted
by such objections, that God brought about our moral knowledge. And,
what’s more, this answer also works in reply to epistemological objections
to normative realism more broadly: it doesn’t rely on the kind of normative
belief targeted by such objections. I conclude that, while the theist does
have a distinctive reply to epistemological objections, it is both far from
obvious and very different from what many assume it would look like.
In § 1, I lay out several different epistemological objections to moral
realism before outlining one in more detail—an evolutionary debunking
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argument—so that I might rely on it as a test case. In § 2, I review several
philosophers’ claims that theistic moral realism enjoys immunity from
such epistemological objections. I then outline what I think is a natural
case to be made for these claims. Then, in § 3, I issue a challenge for this
“natural reply”: it seems to violate the requirement (which I defend) that
replies to the evolutionary debunking argument not rely on a substantive
moral claim. In § 4, I issue a challenge for the theistic moral realist: she
must argue that God has most normative reason to bring about our moral
knowledge. In § 5, I show two ways in which the theist might meet this
challenge. Finally, in § 6, I argue that both responses also work in reply to
epistemological objections to normative realism more broadly.
1. Epistemological Objections to Moral Realism
Moral realism is the thesis that (i) sincere moral judgments express beliefs,
(ii) some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of some moral beliefs
does not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypo
thetical agent.1 Many epistemological objections to moral realism have it
that realism entails moral skepticism. Yet different objections have it that
this entailment holds because of different constraints on knowledge—constraints that, if realism were true, we purportedly could not meet. In this
section, I’ll briefly summarize a number of these general epistemological
objections to moral realism, before going on to develop one at greater
length. This last argument will be a test case for many of the claims I make
about theistic moral realism in this paper.
Some think that to know something we must believe it by means of a
non-accidentally reliable method and that moral realism fails this constraint:2
No Accident
1.

To know that P, S must believe that P by means of a non-accidentally reliable method.

2.

If moral realism is true, then no agent believes any substantive
moral claim by means of a non-accidentally reliable method.

3.

Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge.

By “substantive moral knowledge,” I mean knowledge of a substantive moral claim.3 What makes a moral claim substantive is hard to say:
“Discrimination on the basis of race is bad” is substantive; “Either Bob’s
discrimination was bad or it’s not the case that it was bad” is not. We don’t
See, e.g., Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 1; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously,

1

3–4.

2
See Setiya, Knowing Right From Wrong, ch 3. For non-accidentality as a general constraint
on knowledge, see Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.”
3
The “substantive” qualifier isn’t always included, but it should be. No matter the nature
of moral facts, we could have knowledge of analytic moral claims.
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need a precise definition: debunkers are targeting knowledge of claims
like the first example, but not the second.
Many others worry that if realism is true, it would be an unexplained
coincidence if our moral faculties were reliable:4
No Coincidence
4.

To know that P, it must not be an unexplained coincidence that the
faculties that produce S’s belief that P are reliable.

5.

If moral realism is true, then it would be an unexplained coincidence
if any agent’s moral faculties (at least those that produce substantive
moral beliefs) were reliable.

6.

Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge.

Two other objections to moral realism can be grouped together. According to the first, if realism is true, then in the nearest possible worlds
in which our moral beliefs are false, we still have those beliefs—i.e., they
are insensitive:5
Sensitivity
7.

If for some belief that P, S believes that P in the nearest possible
worlds in which not-P, then S does not know that P.

8.

If moral realism is true, then all agents would have the substantive moral beliefs they actually do in the nearest possible worlds in
which those beliefs are false.

9.

Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge.

According to another objection, moral realism entails that in most of the
near-by possible worlds in which we have the moral beliefs we do, our
moral beliefs are false—i.e., they are unsafe:6
Safety
10. If for some belief that P, P is false in most of the near-by possible
worlds in which S believes that P, then S does not know that P.
4
Street, “Darwinian Dilemma” and Street, “Reply to Copp.” See also Bedke, “Intuitive
Non-Naturalism”; Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking”; and Parfit, On What Matters,
492–497. Finally, for presentation of a similar argument, see Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously,
ch. 7 (esp. 7.2).
5
Bedke, “Intuitive Non-Naturalism”; Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics”; and Kahane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” See also Joyce, The Myth of Morality, 163–165 and
Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 125–126, especially n26. For a very similar way of formulating
sensitivity (and safety), see, e.g., Pritchard, “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology.”
6
See Ruse and Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics”; Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 181;
Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 120–121; and even Darwin, The Descent of Man, 102. See also
Bogardus, “Only All Naturalists.”
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11. If moral realism is true, then all agents’ substantive moral beliefs
are false in most of the near-by possible worlds in which they have
those beliefs.
12. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge.
There will be further details and problems for each of these four arguments, but such will be irrelevant here.
One might wonder what it is particularly about realism that generates
these worries. That is, why does realism make it the case that (for example)
no agent believes any substantive moral claim by means of a non-accidentally reliable method, and so on for the other constraints on knowledge?
There is no helpful answer available at this point in the dialectic since
the second premise of each argument could be supported in a number of
different ways. However, it will be helpful to see one important way these
premises have recently been supported. To this I now turn.
Though they are inherently more general in scope, most of these objections have recently been made in a very particular form. That is, each
has it that if realism is true, then our moral beliefs fail some particular
necessary condition on knowledge. But many philosophers have argued
that it is the influence of evolution on our moral beliefs that results in the
failure of that necessary condition.7 For most of the rest of my paper, I deal
exclusively with such evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). I do
this primarily just in order to have a single test case. But EDAs are an especially good test case for claims about the more general objections since for
any of those objections there is an EDA that is a particular version of it. For
these reasons, let us turn now to consider what I call the Standard EDA:
The Standard EDA
13. (Epistemological Premise) If (a) moral realism is true, (b) evolution
has strongly influenced our moral faculties in such a way that those
faculties are disposed to produce beliefs with certain propositional
contents over others, and (c) there is no independent confirmation
of the reliability of those faculties, then we have no substantive
moral knowledge.
14. (Empirical Premise) Evolution has strongly influenced our moral
faculties in such a way that those faculties are disposed to produce
beliefs with certain propositional contents over others.
15. (Autonomy) There is no independent confirmation of the reliability
of our moral faculties.

7
See Street, “Darwinian Dilemma”; Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, ch. 13; and Joyce, The
Evolution of Morality. See also Horn, “Evolution and the Epistemological Challenge”; Greene,
“Secret Joke”; Kitcher, “Biology and Ethics”; and Ruse and Wilson, “Moral Philosophy as
Applied Science.”
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16. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no substantive
moral knowledge.8
Let’s briefly look at the premises in more detail.
Premise (14) is not my concern here, since theism generally does nothing
to aid a denial of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties.9 Perhaps
theists have a special purchase on denials of evolution altogether—but I
will make my task easier by only considering types of theism which are
compatible with evolutionary biology. Premise (15) will end up being the
theist’s target. But before moving on to see whether she can hit that target,
let’s get a quick look at how the standard debunker could support (13).
It is (13) where the four general epistemological objections above come
into play. As one example, consider:
SensitivityEDA
17. If (a)–(c) hold, then we would still have our moral beliefs in the
nearest possible worlds in which they are false.
18. If we would believe that P in the nearest possible worlds in which
P is false, then we do not know that P.
19. Therefore, if (a)–(c) hold, then we have no substantive moral knowledge.
(18) simply represents the general constraint on knowledge mentioned
originally in premise (7) of Sensitivity. The other constraints could (and
have) played similar roles in defense of (13).
But what about (17)? What is it about realism that generates the worry
that our moral beliefs are insensitive (when assuming evolutionary pressure and no independent confirmation)? Roughly, the worry is that my
belief that I ought to take care of my children is adaptive regardless of
whether it is true: believing it makes us more likely to pass on our genetic
material even if it is false. (Compare to the perceptual case: it is usually
only adaptive to believe that there is a tiger nearby if there actually is.)
Thus, in the nearest worlds in which this claim is false, we still believe it.
Anti-realists don’t face the same fate. Take the (toy) anti-realist view
that an act is wrong iff—and wholly because—I believe that it is wrong.
On this view, supposing that it is true that I ought to take care of my children, this is only true because I believe that it is true. Where it is false, I do
not believe that it is true—as a direct result of the theory. So, in the nearest
worlds in which it is false, I do not believe it.
8
This argument is meant to capture what is common to the EDAs cited in n. 7 above in the
most charitable way possible.
9
Critics of (14) include Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 5–8; Fitzpatrick, “No
Darwinian Dilemma,” 241–246; Parfit, On What Matters, 534–538; Huemer, “Revisionary
Intuitionism”; James, An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics, 79–81; Copp, “Darwinian Skepticism,” 194; Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 155. Such replies, while theism-compatible, are
not uniquely theistic.
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There is a version of the Standard EDA that relies on each of the constraints on knowledge above, but I need not spell them out here. My point
here is simply to show how the Standard EDA can be a vehicle for a variety
of different epistemological objections and to set the stage for an explanation of how theists might reply to the Standard EDA. In extremely general
terms, on the Standard EDA realists supposedly run afoul of each constraint
because they think that the moral facts “float free” of our moral beliefs,
whereas anti-realists think that there is a close dependence of the facts on
our beliefs, allowing them to say that such beliefs are non-coincidentally
true, formed on the basis of a non-accidentally reliable method, etc.
2. The Natural Theistic Reply to the Standard EDA
Many philosophers seem to think that, while the Standard EDA is at the
very least prima facie problematic for the realist, it is clearly not problematic for the theistic moral realist.10 In most cases, this seems to be so clear to
such philosophers that they relegate the point to a short paragraph, if not
a footnote. Thus, Kahane:
If we were the designed products of God, then it does seem rational for us to
rely on our natural doxastic dispositions given that these were implanted in
us by an omniscient and omnibenevolent being.11

Bedke similarly claims:
Given this [our moral beliefs’ causal history], it would be a great cosmic
coincidence if the causal order were orchestrated just perfectly, so as to produce intuitions and beliefs that accurately reflect the ethical facts. We would
need something like a god rigging the ethical facts and the causal order so
as to ensure their serendipitous coincidence.12

The idea, I think, being that if we had evidence of such a god, the evolutionary objection from “cosmic coincidence”—in Bedke’s terms—would
disappear.
There are also those who claim that theism can easily solve a general
epistemological objection. Parfit considers an argument from massive
coincidence that is independent of evolutionary considerations and claims
that:
God might have designed our brains so that, without such causal contact
[with mathematical facts], we can reason in ways that lead us to reach true
answers to mathematical questions. We might have similar God-given abilities to respond to reasons, and to form true beliefs about these reasons.13
10
Besides those below, see Wielenberg, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 460; Bogardus, “Only
All Naturalists,” 7, 12–13; Crow, “Plantingian Pickle,” 10–11; and Fitzpatrick, “No Darwinian
Dilemma,” 250.
11
Kahane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” 109. See also n16, which acknowledges
further complexities.
12

Bedke, “Intuitive Non-Naturalism,” 190.

13

Parfit, On What Matters, 493.
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And likewise, in discussing the argument from non-accidental reliability
mentioned above, Setiya claims that:
Things look different if we turn to God. Assuming God can know the truth
in ethics, even if it is irreducible, he may create in us, or some of us, reliable
dispositions. On this account, ethical principles can explain how we are disposed to form true beliefs [thus meeting the non-accidental reliability constraint]. This is, I think, the only hope for ethical knowledge if the facts are
constitutively independent of us.14

So according to Setiya, not only can theism solve a major epistemological
problem for realism, but it alone can.
However, things are not so easy for the theist as such philosophers have
made them look. In fact, what’s lacking from all of these philosophers’
work is any real description of how the theistic response to the Standard
EDA is supposed to work. In the rest of this section, I hope to give a plausible model for how a theistic reply to the Standard EDA would proceed.
Only then can I point out the obstacles to such a reply.
First, we should get clear on the goal of theistic replies to the Standard
EDA. Some of the quoted theistic replies above may be read as arguing
that it is possible that realism is true, and we have moral knowledge. It is
tempting to read them, that is, as arguing:
a. The evolutionary debunking argument fails in general, because it is
possible that theism is true, and on theism, it’s possible that moral
realism is true and we have substantive moral knowledge.
(a) takes the task of debunking arguments to be to show the impossibility of
moral knowledge. But this doesn’t make sense of why such authors go on
to present their own non-theistic proposals—why would they, if they had
already defeated the Standard EDA?
My construal of debunking arguments makes sense of such reasoning:
the Standard EDA is an argument that we don’t have moral knowledge on
realism, not that we can’t. (Nor does it proceed to the former by way of the
latter: surely the Empirical Premise is, if true, only contingently true.) So,
the theist needs to do more than show the compossibility of (i) her brand
of theism,15 (ii) moral realism, and (iii) our substantive moral knowledge.
Yet she need not show that (iii) deductively follows from (i) and (ii), since she
is only trying to rebut an argument that (ii) and (iii) don’t co-obtain. So, the
theist’s task is to show, instead:
b. The Standard EDA fails for theists because, on the assumption of
one’s brand of theism, it’s plausible—not merely possible—that if
moral realism is true, then we have substantive moral knowledge.

14

Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, 114.

By one’s “brand” of theism I mean simply theism, plus whatever claims one endorses
about God that are not essential to theism per se.
15
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This means that, with a very important exception to be noted shortly, the
theist is free to rely on any claim that is plausible on the assumption of her
brand of theism to show that assuming (i) and (ii) makes (iii) plausible.
So, here’s one example of how the theist could reply to the Standard
EDA. Call it “the Natural Reply.” God, if he exists, is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Because he is omnipotent and omniscient, he
has the ability to either (a) start the causal order in such a way that evolution results in human beings who have moral knowledge or (b) monitor
the evolutionary process and intervene in the causal order to “tweak” that
process if he foresees that it will lead to humans who don’t have moral
knowledge.16 The latter would be a form of “special divine action,” which
is assumed by some to be more problematic than other forms of God’s
action such as creating and sustaining the world.17 I will employ no such
assumption here,18 but at any rate, if special divine action is especially
problematic, (a) is still open for the theist.
To see how this would work in more detail, assume that the standard
debunker supports (13)—the Epistemological Premise—via SensitivityEDA.
In either (a) or (b), we would end up with sensitive moral beliefs: in the
nearest possible worlds in which our actual moral beliefs are false, God
brings it about that we don’t have them. (Of course, he could do (b) while
also doing something akin to (a)—i.e., starting the causal order in such a
way that, with the fewest possible “tweaks” on his part, it will result in
humans with true moral beliefs.) And—very importantly—because God
is morally perfect, he will do either (a) or (b). This is because a morally
perfect being wants his creatures to be good, and goodness (at least for
humans) requires moral knowledge.19
3. A Challenge for the Natural Reply
In this section, I will present a challenge for the Natural Reply. My argument relies on a controversial constraint on replies to the Standard EDA.
I give an argument for that constraint, but in the end, I assume its truth
for the sake of argument: if it is false, replies are incredibly cheap, and
all realists—theists and non-theists—are in the clear. To be clear: I don’t
want to argue that the Natural Reply decisively fails. I mean just to use it
as a specific model to show what I’ll then argue is a much more general
challenge for theistic replies.
The Natural Reply relies on the following claims: (i) a morally perfect
being would want his creatures to be morally good, and (ii) moral goodness
(at least for humans) requires moral knowledge (and hence, e.g., sensitive
16
See Sober, “Evolution Without Naturalism” and Sober, “Evolutionary Theory, Causal
Completeness, and Theism” for an argument that it is compatible with evolutionary theory
that God guided certain mutations.
17

See Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, ch. 3.

18

See Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, chs. 3–4, for an argument that it is false.

The Natural Reply might be thought problematic independently of its use as a reply to
the Standard EDA. But such objections are not my concern here.
19
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moral beliefs). Each of these is plausibly a substantive moral claim; surely
at least one is. But recall that the Standard EDA attempts to give decisive
reason to think that it is precisely substantive moral claims that we can’t
know to be true. Surely we are unjustified in relying on a premise P in
an explanation if we have decisive reason to think that we don’t know
that P. (Imagine telling your friend that he shouldn’t eat meat because it
results in harm to animals but that you don’t know that it results in harm
to animals!) So, by relying on (i) and (ii) in her reply to the Standard EDA,
the theist assumes that she does not have decisive reason to think that she
doesn’t know that those claims are true. But this is just to assume that the
Standard EDA fails in the course of an argument that attempts to show
that the Standard EDA fails.
The problem is going to be hard to get away from for the theist. He
could easily fill in the details of his story differently: perhaps God wants
us to have moral knowledge because a morally perfect being would want
to maximize utility, and the best way for humans to maximize utility is
by their having moral knowledge. (Again, there may be independent
problems here.) But it’s easy to see that this variation also relies on a substantive moral claim and will for that reason also beg the question against
epistemological objections. Because the problem is so general, we can
formulate it as a condition on any theistic reply to the epistemological
objections in question:
(No Moral Claims) A reply to an epistemological objection to moral realism cannot rely on a substantive moral premise.20
(I will soon argue that No Moral Claims ought to be narrower, but this is the
constraint as it is suggested in the literature.)
Let’s say that a reply to an epistemological objection relies on a premise
just when the content of that premise is part of the explanation of why we
have moral knowledge. Importantly, a reply doesn’t rely on a premise (in
this restricted sense) when it merely enables the explanation of our moral
knowledge.21 That I desired a Dr. Pepper might be part of the explanation
of why I walked to the 7-Eleven. Yet, though I wouldn’t have walked to
the 7-Eleven had I desired much more strongly to stay home, that I didn’t
desire more strongly to stay home is not part of the explanation of my
walking to 7-Eleven. It merely enables the explanation. In my sense then,
the explanation of my walking to the 7-Eleven relies on the claim that I desired a Dr. Pepper, but not on the claim that I didn’t desire more strongly
to stay at home.
A brief word on the necessity of the distinction: lots of things are relevant, in some broad sense, to an explanation. It is in this broad sense that
20
As I will construe it, No Moral Claims bans relying on substantive moral claims regardless of whether they are considered “part of” one’s theistic position (as opposed to being an
independent premise). Mutatis mutandis for all later modifications of No Moral Claims.
21

See Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, ch. 3.
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both my desire for Dr. Pepper and my lack of overriding desire are relevant
to my walking to the 7-Eleven. And it is in the same sense that it’s relevant
that I’m not asleep, and that I’m generally physically able to pursue the
objects of my desires. But we don’t want all of these things entering into the
explanans—otherwise the explanans will be infinitely large! After all, there
are infinitely many desires that I don’t have but that (if I did have them)
would override my present desire for a Dr. Pepper. So, we need some way
of distinguishing those things that are relevant to the explanation, but
which aren’t themselves part of the explanans. And what seems to unite
such things is that, either by their presence or absence, they allow the explanation to occur.
No Moral Claims only says that replies to epistemological objections to realism cannot rely on substantive moral claims and leaves open whether they
can have substantive moral enabling conditions. The reason for the latter
is that, if replies couldn’t have substantive moral enabling conditions, it
would be impossible to give a successful reply of any kind to the epistemological objection in question. For here is a condition without meeting which
any such reply would fail: that there is a (morally) evil demon deceiving us
about everything (or at least, everything it’s possible for us to be deceived
about). Were there such a demon, no exculpatory reply on behalf of our
moral knowledge could succeed; yet the absence of such a demon seems
not to be part of the explanans of how we have any given kind of knowledge,
but rather to merely enable the explanation. Thus, any such reply, theistic or
not, fails without the enabling condition that there is no such demon.
I think that, in light of that, No Moral Claims would be overbroad were
it to outlaw substantive moral enabling conditions. But let me settle for
establishing just this: were No Moral Claims to outlaw substantive moral
enabling conditions, my project, as well as anyone else’s who wants to
reply to any epistemological objection to realism, would be doomed from
the start (whether it relies on theism or not). So, I’ll assume that No Moral
Claims allows for substantive moral enabling conditions—i.e., it reads as I
formulate it above—for the sake of argument.
There is a hardy debate about whether No Moral Claims is true. Many
argue that it is.22 Many others argue that it is not, since in order to reply
to skepticism in other domains—e.g., the perceptual—we must rely on
substantive claims within that domain.23 I cannot settle the dispute here.
22
See Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 32–35; Horn, “Evolution and the Epistemological Challenge”; Behrends, “Meta-normative Realism,” 7–8; Vavova, “Debunking
Evolutionary Debunking,” 81; Morton, “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument”; and
Morton, “When Do Replies.”
23
See Schafer, “Evolution and Normative Scepticism,” 475–476; Shafer-Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 21–23; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 175; Setiya, Knowing Right
from Wrong, 79; White, “You Just Believe that Because . . . ,” sec. 4.2; Vavova, “Debunking
Evolutionary Debunking,” sec. 3.1; Berker, “Does Evolutionary Psychology,” sec. 8; and
Dogramaci, “Explaining Our Moral Reliability.” See also Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics” and Bedke, “Intuitive Non-Naturalism,” sec. 3.2, although these are more general
over-generalization worries.
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I think No Moral Claims is plausible enough. But more importantly, as
above, the question I’m concerned with here—whether theism is immune
to epistemological objections to realism—is really only interesting on the
assumption of No Moral Claims. If we can rely on substantive moral claims
in replying to the Standard EDA, then replies are fairly cheap.24 David
Enoch—and other proponents of “third-factor replies”—have shown how,
on the assumption of just one substantive moral premise, it is no longer
surprising that we ended up with true moral beliefs.
Enoch assumes that anything that promotes survival is at least somewhat good. If that’s right, then when X promotes survival, X is good. But
when X promotes survival, because of the evolutionary story, we should
also not be surprised that we ended up believing that X is good (it will
make us more likely to pursue X). This gives us an explanation of the
striking correlation of our moral beliefs with the moral facts.25 This sort
of reply could at the very least succeed against versions of the Standard
EDA that identify the fundamental epistemological problem as one of
accidental reliability or coincidental truth since, if we have an explanation of the correlation of our beliefs and their truth, their truth is not a
coincidence, nor is our reliability accidental. And it may be harnessed as a
reply to safety- and sensitivity-based worries (though I cannot pursue this
question here). So, I will assume No Moral Claims because our question
here is only of interest if it is true.
The Natural Reply, though it does seem to rely on substantive moral
claims, is not necessarily doomed. As I’ll argue in section 5, relying on
substantive moral claims is not automatically a problem: just when they
are constitutively independent of any agent’s attitudes. I’ll leave open (for
now) whether the Natural Reply has the resources to maintain that each
of the substantive moral claims it relies on are not mind-independent in
this way. So, let the content of this section stand as a defeasible worry for
the Natural Reply.
4. A Challenge for Any Theistic Reply
But No Moral Claims isn’t just a problem for the Natural reply. In this section,
I’ll issue a challenge to any theistic reply to the Standard EDA: the theist
needs to avoid appealing to a substantive moral claim in the course of what
I’ll argue is her best line of response to the Standard EDA. I think that the
theist can answer the challenge. It’s just that answering the challenge turns
the theistic reply into something far different than the Natural Reply.
The theist’s job, in giving a distinctly theistic reply to the Standard EDA,
is to show that, on the assumption of her brand of theism, the following
claim is true:
24
Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, ch. 7; Schafer, “Evolution and Normative Scepticism,”
477; Wielenberg, “Evolutionary Debunking”; Brosnan, “Do the Evolutionary Origins”; Skarsaune, “Darwin and Moral Realism”; Parfit, On What Matters, 532–533; Setiya, Knowing Right
from Wrong, ch. 2; and Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth,” 125.
25

See Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 7.4.
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(Divine Action) God has intentionally acted so as to bring about (or
make likely) our moral knowledge.
Of course, there are logically possible alternatives here, which still make
appeal to God. Perhaps, for example, God unintentionally brought about
our moral knowledge. But these alternatives seem so implausible that the
theist, in appealing to them, would no longer have a minimally plausible
response to the Standard EDA. So, since theism doesn’t on its own entail
Divine Action, the theist must convince us that we get Divine Action on the
assumption that her brand of theism is true.
Here’s what I consider a very natural way of doing this. When an omniscient, perfectly rational being—which the God of theism is—has most
overall normative reason (henceforth “reason”) to do something, he will do
that thing. (Aquinas endorses a similar, though weaker thesis—but about
the good rather than normative reasons—when he claims that the “voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended.”26) One argument
for this runs as follows. Assuming a minimal type of motivational internalism, according to which a perfect being’s motives are in proportion to
his beliefs about his reasons, and that a perfect being would be omniscient,
it follows that a perfect being’s motives are in proportion to his reasons.
If perfect beings cannot experience weakness of will, then a perfect being
will always do what he has most overall reason to do.27
So, the theist should argue that God at some point had most overall
reason to bring about our moral knowledge. This would ideally involve
two separate arguments: an argument that God had reason to bring
about our moral knowledge, and an argument that this reason was not
outweighed by any other reasons God had at the time. (That God has
reasons—even moral reasons—to act doesn’t, of course, commit us to the
controversial claim that God has moral obligations since God could have
a (moral) reason to Φ without having an obligation to Φ.28)
Unfortunately, the second task is a huge one. But I take it as prima
facie plausible that the God of theism wouldn’t have strong reason to do
anything incompatible with our moral knowledge—at least, such reason
wouldn’t be strong enough to outweigh his reason to bring about our
moral knowledge. (If I am wrong about this, then we were all silly to assume that the theist could ever have a response to the Standard EDA: God
would not have ever brought about our moral knowledge!) Importantly,
accounts that require this stipulation won’t, just in virtue of this, violate
No Moral Claims. That there are no counter-balancing reasons for God not
to bring about our moral knowledge merely enables, but does not explain,
26
See Aquinas, Summa Theologica IaIIae, Q. 8. See also Leftow, “Aquinas on God and Moral
Truth.”
27
See Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 27–28; Murphy, “Is an Absolutely Perfect Being Morally
Perfect?”; and Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 184–209.
28
See Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” for an argument that
God has no moral obligations.
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why God would bring about our moral knowledge. Rather, God’s reasons
explain why he would so act. Thus, a response that requires that God not
have counter-balancing reason not to bring about our moral knowledge
doesn’t rely on this claim, in the technical sense I use here, and so such a
response won’t violate No Moral Claims. So, I will assume here that if the
theist has shown that God at some point had reason to bring about our
moral knowledge, he has thereby shown that Divine Action is true.
It’s important to see that this is just as much a challenge for theistic replies to any of the epistemological objections that I have mentioned. Recall
that they all share the same conclusion: if moral realism is true, then no
agent has any substantive moral knowledge. So, if theistic responses to the
Standard EDA require the theist to show Divine Action, then likewise for
the other objections. In each case, the theist needs to show the same thing:
that God intentionally brought about our moral knowledge. In order to
reply to any of the objections I’ve mentioned, the theist must argue for
Divine Action without appealing to substantive moral claims.
5. Hope for the Theistic Moral Realist
Thus far, I have played the pessimist. I have issued a challenge that, if
unanswered, entails that theists are not in any privileged position with
regard to answering epistemological objections to moral realism. But in
this section of the paper, I want to explore whether the theist can answer
this challenge. I will outline and evaluate two ways in which the theist
could reply to the Standard EDA—and thus the other epistemological
objections mentioned here—without violating No Moral Claims (or rather,
the condition as it ought to be formulated, which I am about to lay out). I
conclude that the theist actually can successfully reply to epistemological
objections to moral realism, in a way that non-theists cannot.
First let me canvas a type of reply I won’t be giving but to which I see
no in-principle barrier. This kind of reply appeals to divine revelation that
has as its content moral truth. As Tomas Bogardus argues, this could be in
a number of ways.29 Among them: divinely-inspired Scripture, the inner
testimony of the Holy Spirit, etc. Such replies need not rely on any kind of
moral claim—God speaks, and we listen.
I won’t argue against such replies here. But I intend to give a different
kind of reply, one more in line with both the spirit of the Natural Reply,
as well as the comments I canvassed earlier, from Kahane, Bedke, Parfit,
and Setiya.30 The idea behind those authors’ comments, which I tried to
exemplify in the Natural Reply, was to avoid appealing to divine revelation to supply the content of moral truth. Rather, these views attempt to
give theistic accounts of moral knowledge which do not depend on the
knower recognizing the authority of divine testimony. Yet I argue we can
29

Bogardus, “Only All Naturalists.”

I do, however, allow for theists to appeal to revelation of claims that do not run afoul of
No Moral Claims (as it will presently be modified).
30
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still avoid violating No Moral Claims (at least in reformulated form, which
I’ll give shortly).
The appeal of this sort of reply is at least threefold. First, it’s interesting
in its own right to have a distinct kind of reply from revelation-based replies. Second, my reply will be compatible with a broad range of theistic
positions that the revelation-based replies will not. Revelation-based replies don’t come incredibly cheaply: God must have revealed just the right
moral truths, with a fairly high clarity and lack of ambiguity, in order for
this gambit to work. Views on which God has revealed only some relatively peripheral moral truths, or on which we can’t be too sure how to
interpret the moral claims God has made—the list could go on—will not
be able to save moral knowledge. Many theists will therefore not be in a
position to make use of revelation-based replies; a non-revelation-based
theistic reply will be of interest to them. Finally, and perhaps most saliently, revelation-based replies seem to require the knower to recognize
the authority of divine testimony—why else trust the Scriptures, or the
testimony of the Spirit? Such accounts will have a hard time allowing for
the moral knowledge of (at least) those who reject the existence of God.
On the other hand, if replies like mine work, theism saves the possibility
of moral knowledge in general—even for non-theists.
It’s very important to see that No Moral Claims is too broad a restriction,
as stated. Recall the dialectic: debunkers argue that what causes problems
for our moral knowledge is the claim that some moral truths are constitutively independent of anyone’s attitudes. What motivates No Moral Claims
is the idea that, when a realist relies on a moral claim in her response to
the Standard EDA, she’s relying on exactly the kind of claim knowledge of
which the debunker is targeting. So, it seems that No Moral Claims ought
to be restricted:
(No Moral Claims*) A reply to an epistemological objection to moral realism cannot rely on a substantive moral premise that, if true, is true
independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Since it is only attitude-independent moral claims that the Standard EDA
targets, surely it should only be such claims that are off-limits in replying
to the Standard EDA.
So, the moral realist needs to establish that God has a reason to bring
about our moral knowledge without relying on any claim that is both a
substantive moral claim and attitude-independent if true. In the remainder
of this section, I first want to show two ways that the theist could do this.
In the next section, I’ll show why the same general strategy works even
for normative realists replying to epistemological worries for normative
realism.
The key insight in the theistic realist’s response is that moral realists
need not think that all moral truths are attitude-independent. This follows
from realism as I defined it above—it claims only that some moral truths
are mind-independent, not that all are. Of course, the question is whether
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this is the right way of characterizing the debate. For in reality there are
three salient positions: that no moral truths are mind-independent, that
some are, and that all are. I believe the middle claim is the important claim
for the realist. Not only is this often how the debate is characterized31—
especially within the debunking literature32—but the interesting question
seems to be whether there exist any truths of a certain kind (mind-independent moral truths), not so much whether all moral truths are like this.33
At any rate, this is the kind of realism I am concerned with here. So, we
need not worry about whether any given normative claim that the theist
relies on is a substantive moral claim so long as that claim is one such that,
if true, its truth is fully explained by some agent’s (or agents’) attitudes.
God, of course, has attitudes, and there doesn’t seem to be any barrier
to those attitudes explaining his reasons, just as our attitudes often explain
our reasons. The task for the theistic moral realist is to find an attitude that
God plausibly has that could fully explain his reason to bring about our
moral knowledge. The theist must, however, do this in a way that doesn’t
invite further questions about why God has that attitude. Otherwise, it
might be that while God’s reason is grounded in an attitude, he only holds
that attitude because some mind-independent, substantive moral claim is
true, such that the attitude is explained by the mind-independent moral
truth. Then the theist’s story would still violate No Moral Claims*. So, what
we want is a reason that is fully explained by attitudes, where these attitudes are not explained by any further mind-independent, substantive
moral truths.34
Suppose, then, that God wants us to have moral knowledge because it
will be good for us. He wants what is good for us simply because he loves
us—and that seems like as good a place as any to end an explanation.
Thus, God’s reason to bring about our moral knowledge is satisfactorily
explained—in a way that does not demand further explanation—by his
love for us. This reason is thus explained by someone’s attitudes—i.e.,
God’s—and so the theist does not violate No Moral Claims* in relying on
the claim that it obtains.
But why think that moral knowledge will be good for us? Because it
makes us resemble God more, no matter what the moral truths are, and
it is good for us to resemble God. First, since God knows the moral truths
(because he knows everything), our knowing them makes us more like
him. Second, moral knowledge will help us to do what we have moral
reason to do, regardless of what that is, since we are much more likely to
do what we have moral reason to do if we know what that is. To the extent
31

E.g., Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously.

32

E.g., Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 110.

In addition, this keeps the realism/antirealism debate analogous to the externalism/
internalism debate about reasons. See Finlay and Schroeder, “Reasons for Action.”
33

34
A referee worries that, for any reason which I propose is fully explained by an attitude,
it will in fact only be partially explained by that attitude and will require mind-independent,
substantive moral truths to complete that explanation. I think this line of thinking is only
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that we do what we have moral reason to do, we more closely resemble
God since God does what he has moral reason to do.
As Robert Adams has pointed out, the notion of resemblance presents
some peculiar problems.35 It’s not clear what resemblance is for one thing,
since merely sharing a property is not enough: a squirrel could have
the same number of hairs as me and not resemble me any more than an
otherwise identical squirrel. Furthermore, merely resembling God is not
sufficient for goodness: parodies resemble their objects but do not share in
their virtues. (Though Adams is concerned with goodness rather than the
good-for relation, we might have a related worry about the latter: I may
parody God, and thus resemble him, and be worse-off for it.)
I can only dip into such deep waters here, but it is worth noting that
while our theistic realist will eventually want to flesh out her theory of resemblance, the issue doesn’t present the problems it does for Adams and so
is not nearly so pressing. Adams is so worried about the above worries in
large part because he needs to make sure to give a realistic account of resemblance—one on which the fact that two things resemble each other obtains
mind-independently. He has to worry about this because on his view, all
goodness is grounded in resembling God, such that an anti-realistic understanding of resemblance would result in thorough-going anti-realism
about the good, which he wants to avoid.36 But our theistic moral realist is
not committed to the claim that goodness is always grounded in resembling
God—just that this is sometimes the case. And, so, even if resemblance—or
the conditions under which resemblance to God is good for someone—is
mind-dependent, this would only commit us to the claim that well-being
is sometimes mind-dependent. And that is consistent with realism as I’ve
defined it—even realism about well-being in particular.
Now, it might be objected that my explanation above appeals to substantive moral claims. After all, I said that (i) God knows the moral truth,
that (ii) God does what he has moral reason to do, that (iii) knowing the
moral truth will help us do what we have moral reason to do, and that
(because of all this) (iv) we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowledge. Are none of (i–iv) substantive, mind-independent moral claims?
After all, they each use the word “moral,” variously making claims about
moral knowledge, moral truth, and moral reasons.
We saw above that (iv) might be mind-dependent and the theistic
realist can consistently endorse this. But that won’t help with (i)–(iii). So,
I will argue that the theist avoids violating No Moral Claims* here because
none of (i)–(iv) is a substantive moral claim. As I noted above, defining
“substantive moral claim” is very hard, and I argued that we only need a
non-definitional characterization of such claims: they’re the set of claims
plausible if we assume that all moral truths are mind-independent—and I have argued that
realists are not committed to this.
Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 31–33.

35

Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 18.
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knowledge of which debunkers are targeting. While I don’t intend to give
a definition of “substantive moral claim,” I think the following is a good
test, at least for claims that do not represent principles: a claim is a substantive moral claim only if its truth value changes depending on what
we have moral reason to do.37 But (i)–(iv) will be true regardless of what
anyone has moral reason to do.
Consider (i): God, because he knows everything, knows the moral truth
regardless of what moral reasons obtain or fail to obtain. If rational beings
have moral reason to maximize utility, then he knows this. If rational beings have no such reason, he knows this. Now consider (ii): whether God
has moral reason to deceive or refrain from deception, to kill or refrain
from killing, he will still do what he has moral reason to do. Similarly, for
(iii): whether we have moral reason to lie or not (etc.), knowing the moral
truth will help us do what we have moral reason to do. And finally, consider (iv): because of the foregoing, we resemble God insofar as we have
moral knowledge, regardless of what anyone has moral reason to do.38
Before I move on to consider a second strategy for the theistic realist,
let’s consider a second objection: this first strategy relies on claims about
well-being, or the good-for relation. Is well-being a moral phenomenon? If
so, then insofar as such truths are attitude-independent, the theist cannot
rely on substantive claims about well-being, such as that it is good for us
to resemble God.
The theist might try replying that the good-for relation is non-moral. I
think this is right, but for reasons that will soon become clear, this won’t help
the cause. The theist ought instead to argue that the claims about well-being
required to make his case are not true independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Having desires satisfied, experiencing pleasure, being happy: all of these
states can fully explain an increase in well-being, without conflicting with
moral realism, as explained above. Not only that, such explanations are
compatible even with objectivist theories of well-being since objectivist
theories allow that sometimes having a desire satisfied (etc.) is a benefit.
And it’s easy to make the case that moral knowledge will promote such
states without relying on any substantive moral claims: we will be happy/
have more desires filled/experience more pleasure insofar as we resemble
God, regardless of what anyone has moral reason to do. These claims are
37
As I note in the main text, moral principles are an exception: they are often substantive,
while being compatible with the obtaining of any moral reasons. “If punching John shortens
his life, then we have moral reason to refrain from punching him” is technically compatible
with both having moral reason to refrain from punching John and not having such reason
(after all, the conditional is compatible with the falsity of the antecedent). But we can brush
aside such examples here since we’re not aiming for a sure-fire test for some claim’s being a
substantive moral one. The test seems like a good one for claims like (i)–(iv).
38
One might think there is cause for worry here if Robert Adams is right that for any
non-supreme good, X is good because X resembles God, the supreme Good (see Adams,
Finite and Infinite Goods, ch. 1). But even if this is true, claims about resemblance to God
need not be substantive moral claims. That goodness is fully grounded in property P does
not entail that claims about P are moral claims. The hedonistic utilitarian need not say that
claims about pain and pleasure are moral claims, after all.
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generally plausible on the assumption of most theistic views: does God
want us to resemble him even though it won’t make us happier, or fulfill
any of our desires? No—promotion of such states seems like one of the
main reasons he would desire that we resemble him.
A second general route for the theistic moral realist also appeals to the
claim that we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowledge and helps
itself to claims (i)–(iv) above in order to establish that. But instead of arguing
that it is good for us that we resemble God, the theist could here argue that
God desires his own glorification, and he doesn’t desire this for any further
reason—he just desires it.39 Furthermore, the theist could argue, it glorifies
God to have his creation resemble him. Therefore, God’s desire for his own
glorification grounds a reason to bring about our moral knowledge.
It seems perfectly in line with many theistic pictures to say that God desires his own glorification. Furthermore, this is consistent with God being
perfectly well-off since it seems possible for a perfectly well-off being to
have desires. (At any rate, the theist is in much deeper trouble if God has
no desires: it is a common assumption among theists that there are things
God wants us to do.) And of course, if God’s reason to bring about our
moral knowledge is explained by his desire for glorification, the theist
won’t here run afoul of No Moral Claims*.
Some pieces of the above argument appeal to claims tenable on any version of theism. The argument that we resemble God insofar as we possess
moral knowledge appeals only to such claims—(i)–(iv) should be tenable
on any brand of theism (or, at least, any brand compatible with moral realism). Yet both replies appeal also to claims that are not part and parcel of
theism per se. The first reply claims that God loves us and that resembling
God is good for us. The second claims that God desires his own glorification, and that it glorifies God when his creation resembles him. Of these
four claims, none seems entailed by theism per se. But it seems to me that
many brands of theism will accept either the first two or the second two.
And those are the brands of theism that, for all I’ve argued, are in a good
position to give replies to epistemological objections to moral realism.
6. Epistemological Objections to Normative Realism
What I have called the Standard EDA targets moral realism. Yet many
epistemological objections, such as Street’s, have it that if normative realism is true, then we have no normative knowledge.40 (Normative realism
is the thesis that (i) sincere normative judgments express beliefs, (ii) some
of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of some normative beliefs does
not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypothetical
agent.) This begets the worry that an analogue of No Moral Claims holds:
39
This is a weakness of the second strategy that the first does not have: God may only
desire his own glorification because it is good (or because he has reason to, etc.) such that his
glory-based reason is not ultimately explained merely in terms of his attitudes. In that case, the
theist may have to appeal to a mind-independent moral claim, thus violating No Moral Claims*.
40

Street, “Darwinian Dilemma.”
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(No Normative Claims) A reply to an epistemological objection to normative realism cannot rely on a substantive normative premise.
And this is worrisome for the theist in particular because both of the
theistic responses I proposed to the Standard EDA rely on substantive
normative premises.
However, just as with the Standard EDA, I think that No Normative
Claims is over-broad. Normative realism allows that some reasons are
explained by our attitudes: in Mark Schroeder’s example, Ronnie likes
dancing and Bradley doesn’t, and that is enough to explain why Ronnie
has a reason to go to the party but Bradley doesn’t.41 Again, this is allowed
by my definition of normative realism, and there is again reason to think
the important debate is whether there are any normative truths that are
mind-independent. As Schroeder notes, realists of any stripe should agree
that some reasons are explained by our attitudes in this way.42 Schroeder’s
Humean Theory of Reasons is the further, controversial claim that all reasons are so explained.
So just as in the moral case, we ought to reformulate our constraint:
(No Normative Claims*) A reply to an epistemological objection to normative realism cannot rely on a substantive normative premise that, if
true, is true independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Because he doesn’t violate this suitably qualified constraint, the theist
can now simply import his two responses to the Standard EDA, suitably
modified. We resemble God insofar as we have any kind of knowledge,
after all, or insofar as we are disposed to act in accordance with any kind
of reason. So, whether God’s reason springs from his desire for our wellbeing or his desire for glorification, he will have a reason to bring about all
normative knowledge in us.
Conclusion
Many philosophers take it as a truism that theists need not worry at all
over various epistemological objections to moral realism: if God exists,
certainly he could just engineer things in such a way that we end up
with moral knowledge. But the most natural ways of arguing for this are
stripped from us when we recognize that we cannot rely on any mind-independent substantive moral claims. However, there is hope for the theist:
God plausibly has mind-dependent reasons to bring about our moral
knowledge. If so, then the theist can reply to epistemological objections
to moral realism without begging the question. Not only that, but she can
reply to epistemological objections to normative realism without begging
the question. The upshot here is nothing so grand as that moral/normative realists ought to be theists. However, it might be as significant as that
Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 1.
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theists are better off with respect to epistemological objections to moral/
normative realism than are non-theists. To the extent that such objections
succeed, non-theistic realism fails while theistic realism lives to fight another day.43
University of California, Davis
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